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Abstract—Cognitive radio is a promising technology to im-
prove spectral efficiency. However, the secure performance of
a secondary network achieved by using physical layer security
techniques is limited by its transmit power and channel fading.
In order to tackle this issue, a cognitive unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) communication network is studied by exploiting the high
flexibility of a UAV and the possibility of establishing line-of-
sight links. The average secrecy rate of the secondary network
is maximized by robustly optimizing the UAV’s trajectory and
transmit power. Our problem formulation takes into account two
practical inaccurate location estimation cases, namely, the worst
case and the outage-constrained case. In order to solve those
challenging non-convex problems, an iterative algorithm based
on S-Procedure is proposed for the worst case while an iterative
algorithm based on Bernstein-type inequalities is proposed for
the outage-constrained case. The proposed algorithms can obtain
effective suboptimal solutions of the corresponding problems.
Our simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm under
the outage-constrained case can achieve a higher average secrecy
rate with a low computational complexity compared to that of the
algorithm under the worst case. Moreover, the proposed schemes
can improve the secure communication performance significantly
compared to other benchmark schemes.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, UAV communications, physical-
layer security, robust design.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
The explosive increase of wide-band service requirements
and the unprecedented proliferation of mobile devices result
in a severe spectrum scarcity issue. In order to alleviate the
spectrum crunch and to meet the increasing demand for high
data rates, cognitive radio (CR) that aims to realize spectrum
sharing between a primary network and a secondary network
has been proposed to improve the spectral efficiency [1], [2].
Specifically, secondary users (SUs) coexist with primary users
(PUs) in the same frequency spectrum while ensuring that
PUs can tolerate the interference caused by SUs. Due to the
promised high-spectral efficiency brought by CR, it has been
widely investigated in traditional terrestrial communication
networks such as cellular networks, wireless sensor networks,
and relaying networks [3], [4]. However, in CR networks, the
transmit power of a secondary base station should be restricted
in order to guarantee the quality of service (QoS) of the PUs.
What’s worse, the harsh channel fading conditions of terrestrial
communication networks further degrade the performance of
SUs. Thus, it is of utmost importance to study how to improve
the performance of SUs in CR networks.
Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) communications
have been extensively investigated for wireless communi-
cations in both military and civil applications due to the
advantages of UAVs in terms of highly controllable mobility
and flight flexibility [5]-[7]. Compared with terrestrial CR
networks, which are dominated by non-line-of-sight (NLoS)
links due to multipaths and blockages, UAV-enabled CR
networks can flexibly deploy UAVs in the air according to
the actual environment [8]. In particular, the communication
performance of ground nodes can be greatly improved since
the air-to-ground channel is dominated by line-of-sight (LoS)
with generally a small path loss exponent [9]. Moreover,
the LoS channel facilitates the establishment of high data
rate communications between UAVs and ground nodes. In
practice, the throughput of UAV-enabled CR networks can be
significantly improved by designing the UAV’s trajectory that
exploits the extra design degrees of freedom [10], [11]. Thus,
it is promising to exploit UAVs to establish CR networks that
can improve the performance of SUs. However, due to the ex-
istence of strong LoS links from UAVs to PUs in UAV-enabled
CR networks, the interference caused by the cognitive UAV
transmitters to PUs is also increased substantially [12]. Thus,
this is a major challenge for the design of the UAV’s trajectory
and transmission power in UAV-enabled CR networks.
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2Moreover, due to the broadcast nature of wireless com-
munications and the existence of LoS channels, potential
eavesdroppers (Eves) on the ground are more prone to illegally
intercept confidential information sent to legitimate recipients.
It results in a significant security challenge for UAV-enabled
CR networks. Besides conventional cryptography encryption
methods enabling secure information transmission, physical-
layer security technology has emerged as a promising alterna-
tive approach to guarantee the security of wireless communi-
cation systems by exploiting the physical layer characteristics
of wireless channels [13]-[17]. In [18], the physical layer
security of a UAV network was studied to jointly design the
trajectory and transmission power of the UAV in order to
maximize the minimum average secrecy rate of all users. As a
significant metric for physical layer security, it was shown that
the secrecy rate is closely related to channel conditions [19].
Thus, it is necessary to design the trajectory in UAV-enabled
CR networks to improve the secure performance of SUs.
To unlock the potential of UAV-enabled communication
systems, joint UAV’s trajectory and transmit power design
has been studied under different scenarios [29]-[33]. However,
these works assumed perfect channel estimations, which de-
pends on the availability of accurate estimation for the loca-
tions of ground nodes. In practice, it is extremely difficult to
acquire the exact location of PUs/Eves due to the existence of
location estimation errors and quantization errors. Especially
in UAV-enabled CR networks, it is challenging for a UAV to
keep tracking the exact location of PUs/Eves via a camera
or a synthetic aperture radar due to the energy limitation
of the UAV [20]. As a result, the trajectory design and
power allocation based on the assumption of perfect location
information may lead to a large performance loss for UAV-
enabled CR networks in practice. Recently, although the robust
trajectory and transmit power designs have been considered
in [16], [17], only the worst-case scenario has been studied.
Specifically, in the worst-case scenario, the location errors
are modeled by bounded sets. However, the bounded location
error model usually leads to a conservative resource allocation
which underestimates the actual communication performance
of UAV systems. Thus, in the considered UAV-enabled CR
network, we not only focus on the robust design based
on the bounded location error model, but also consider the
robust design based on the probabilistic location error model.
For the latter model, the location errors are captured by a
probability distribution [21], and outage probability constraints
are proposed to replace the excessively conservative worst-case
constraints adopted in the existing robust designs. Under this
model, UAV-enabled CR networks can achieve better perfor-
mance. In particular, the latter robust design is more suitable
for scenarios with delay-sensitive communication devices [27].
Our proposed two robust UAV’s trajectory and transmit power
optimization schemes in this paper are promising to improve
the secure communication performance of SUs against the
channel estimation error and offer a better protection to the
performance of PUs. Moreover, the studied fair performance
comparison between the two proposed robust designs is helpful
for the performance analysis in UAV-enabled CR networks
with practically imperfect channel state information (CSI).
B. Related Works
1) Traditionally terrestrial CR networks: The designs of ro-
bust resource allocation in traditionally terrestrial CR commu-
nication networks have been investigated under the bounded
CSI error model in [22], [23] and under the probabilistic
CSI error model in [24]-[26]. Specifically, in [22], the worst-
case robust secure multiobjective resource allocation scheme
was studied for multiple-input single-output CR networks
with simultaneously wireless information and power transfer.
Beamforming was designed to strike the tradeoff between the
considered conflicting system design objectives. In [23], the
authors studied the worst-case robust design of secure wireless
information and power transfer in a cognitive relaying system.
It was shown that by introducing a joint robust beamforming,
transformation matrix and power splitting method, the mini-
mization of transmit power can be achieved in the worst-case
scenario. In order to improve the performance of CR networks
under the bounded CSI error model, robust resource allocation
designs under the outage probability constraints were proposed
[24]-[26]. In [24], a robust beamforming problem was studied
in CR networks to minimize the total SU’s transmit power
via considering probabilistic chance constraints. It was shown
that the robust beamforming design taking into account chance
constraints is an effective approach to improve the perfor-
mance compared to the conventional worst-case based method.
Under the PU’s performance outage probability constraints,
a robust cooperative beamforming was optimized for a CR
relaying network in [25]. In [26], the SU power allocation
problem was studied in a CR network with uncertain knowl-
edge of interference information. In [27] and [28], robust
beamforming designs were considered under two different CSI
error models in wireless power transfer systems. However,
the robust resource allocation schemes proposed in [22]-[28]
are not applicable to UAV-enabled CR networks, since the
channels in UAV-enabled CR networks are LoS channels and
are coupled with the trajectory of UAVs.
2) UAV-enabled CR networks: To improve the throughput
of SUs in CR networks, UAV-enabled CR communication
systems were studied in [29]-[33]. In [29], the authors investi-
gated spectrum sharing in UAV-enabled small-cell networks to
maximize the throughput. In [30], an multiple-input multiple-
output CR system was studied to maximize the achievable rate.
In [31], a UAV-based CR system was proposed to improve the
detection performance of spectrum sensing and access the idle
spectrum. In [32], a UAV-aided CR satellite terrestrial network
was investigated. By jointly optimizing the base station/UAV
transmit power and the UAV’s trajectory, the achievable rate
of the ground user can be maximized. In [33], the authors
deployed a cognitive UAV to convey data to a set of Internet-
of-Things devices. Although the above literature discussed the
application of cognitive UAVs in various scenarios, they did
not address the robust UAV’s trajectory and transmit power
design issues in UAV-enabled CR networks when the locations
of ground nodes cannot be accurately estimated.
C. Contributions and Organization
In this paper, we focus on designing robust trajectory and
transmit power for secure UAV-enabled CR networks under
3two practical cases that the locations of Eves and PUs cannot
be accurately obtained. Two practical estimation error models
are considered, namely, the bounded location error model
and the probabilistic location error model. There is one SU,
multiple Eves, and multiple PUs in the networks. It is assumed
that the UAV knows the accurate location of the SU, but
only knows the approximate regions where PUs and Eves
are located. Our goal is to maximize the average secrecy
rate subject to the UAV’s maximum mobility constraint, the
UAV’s transmit power constraint, and the average interference
power constraint. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work that studies the robust design of secure UAV-enabled CR
networks under these two location error models. Although the
bounded location error model has been studied in [16], [17],
and the probabilistic location error model has been studied in
[21], the proposed schemes in [16], [17] are only applicable to
conventional wireless terrestrial communication networks and
cannot work in UAV-enabled CR networks, and the physical-
layer security issue in CR networks has not been considered
in [21], and thus the security of the UAV-enabled network
cannot be guaranteed. Different from existing works, the main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• The robust trajectory and transmit power design problem
is first studied in the secure UAV-enabled CR networks
under the bounded location error model. The consid-
ered worst-case robust average secrecy rate maximization
(WCR-ASRM) problem is intractable due to its non-
convexity and the existence of semi-infinite constraints.
To tackle the intractability, we propose a suboptimal
algorithm to iteratively solve an approximation problem
obtained by using the successive convex approximation
(SCA) method and S-Procedure.
• An outage-constrained robust average secrecy rate max-
imization (OCR-ASRM) problem is formulated for se-
cure UAV-enabled CR networks under the probabilistic
location error model. The relationship between the two
location error models is studied and highlighted. The
Bernstein-type inequalities are exploited to approximate
the probabilistic constraints which are difficult to handle
since they have no closed-from expressions. The original
problem is tackled by an iterative algorithm based on the
SCA method and a suboptimal solution is obtained.
• Simulation results and theoretical derivations show that
the robust trajectory and transmit power design under
the probabilistic location error model achieves a higher
average secrecy rate and a lower algorithm complex-
ity compared to that under the bounded location error
model. Besides, our proposed robust schemes can achieve
a larger average secrecy rate compared to benchmark
schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model is presented. Section III presents a robust tra-
jectory and transmit power design problem under the bounded
location error model. Section IV presents a robust trajectory
and transmit power design problem under the probabilistic
location error model. In Section V, simulation results are
presented. Finally, this paper is concluded in Section VI.
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Fig. 1. A UAV-enabled CR system with one SU, K Eves, and L PUs.
Notations: Boldface capital letters and boldface lower case
letters represent matrixes and vectors, respectively. CM×N ,
HN , R, and In denote the set of M -by-N complex matrixs, the
set of N -by-N Hermitian matrices, the set of all real numbers,
and a n × n identity matrix, respectively. xT represents the
transpose of a vector x. <{x} denotes the real part of vector
x. ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector. x ∼ N(µ,Σ)
means that x is a real-valued random vector following a
Gaussian distribution with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ.
[a]+ denotes the function max(a, 0). ∇2f (x, y) denotes a
square matrix composed of second-order partial derivatives
of the multivariate function f (x, y). A0 means that A is
a Hermitian positive semi-definite matrix. Tr(A) and vec(A)
denote the trace operation and the vectorization, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A downlink secure UAV-enabled CR network under spec-
trum sharing is considered in Fig. 1, where a cognitive UAV
transmits a piece of confidential information to a ground SU
over the spectrum band of the PUs, in the presence of a set
of K ground Eves, and L ground PUs. Let K , {1, ...,K}
denote the set of Eves and L , {1, ..., L} denote the set of
PUs. In this paper, we consider a three-dimensional Cartesian
coordinate system where the SU, the lth PU, and the kth
Eve, l ∈ L, k ∈ K, have fixed horizontal location of
qs = (xs, ys)
T , ql = (xp,l, yp,l)
T , and ek = (xe,k, ye,k)
T ,
respectively. Similar to the work in [34], it is assumed that
the UAV flies at a constant altitude H to avoid encountering
obstacles. Specifically, in the horizontal direction, the UAV
flies from the pre-determined initial location qI = (xI , yI)
T to
the final location qF = (xF , yF )
T with the time-varying hor-
izontal location q (t) = (x (t) , y (t))T , where t ∈ T = [0, T ]
and T is the flight duration.
In order to facilitate the trajectory design of the UAV, the
flight duration T is equally divided into N sufficiently small
time slot with each duration of dt. Due to the sufficiently small
dt, the state of the UAV in each time slot can be regarded as
static. Thus, the flight trajectory of the UAV can be expressed
as q [n] = (x [n] , y [n])T , where n ∈ N , {1, ..., N}. The
initial location qI and the final location qF can be denoted
as q [1] and q [N ], respectively. Considering a practical speed
4constraint of the UAV, the mobility constraint of the UAV can
be expressed as
‖q [n]− q [n− 1]‖2 ≤ (Vmaxdt)2, ∀n ∈ N , (1)
where Vmax is the maximum available horizontal speed of the
UAV. Let P [n] denote the transmit power of the UAV in time
slot n, P¯ and Pmax denote the average transmit power and
the peak transmit power of the UAV, respectively. Thus, the
average and peak transmit power constraints imposed on the
UAV can be given as, respectively,
1
N
N∑
n=1
P [n] ≤ P¯ , (2a)
0 ≤ P [n] ≤ Pmax, ∀n ∈ N . (2b)
Since UAVs generally operate above moderate altitude [8],
the channels from the UAV to SU, PUs, and Eves are all
dominated by LoS components [16], [17]. Thus, the distance
between the UAV and the receivers can be used to determine
the corresponding channels. Specifically, the channel power
gain from the UAV to the SU in time slot n is given by
h [n] =
β0
‖q [n]− qs‖2 +H2
, (3)
where β0 denotes the channel power gain with reference
distance 1 m. In time slot n, the channel power gains from the
UAV to the lth PU and the kth Eve are given as, respectively,
sl [n] =
β0
‖q [n]− ql‖2 +H2
, (4)
gk [n] =
β0
‖q [n]− ek‖2 +H2
. (5)
Note that accurate ql and ek are unknown due to the existence
of location estimation errors and quantization errors. It is
assumed that the potential location regions of the PUs and
Eves can be estimated at the UAV. This assumption can be
justified from two aspects. On the one hand, due to the LoS
link in UAV communications, it is possible for a UAV to obtain
the approximate location of eavesdroppers via a camera or a
synthetic aperture radar [35]. On the other hand, the UAV
can obtain the estimated location of the PUs via cooperation
between the primary network and the secondary network [27].
Moreover, Eves may be legitimate SUs in the past but do not
have the privilege to access the confidential information in
the current communication slots [21], [22]. In this case, the
location of Eves can be estimated via the previous cooperation
between Eves and the UAV.
In order to guarantee the QoS of all PUs, the interference
temperature (IT) constraint is applied [36]. In this case, the
interference caused by the UAV to all PUs is controlled and
limited. The average interference power constraint of the lth
PU is given by
1
N
N∑
n=1
sl [n]P [n] ≤ Υ, l ∈ L, (6)
where Υ denotes the constant IT threshold imposed on all
PUs. On the other hand, to guarantee secure transmission from
the UAV to the SU, the physical layer security technique is
employed, and the average secrecy rate of the SU during the
flight time T is given by
Rsec =
1
N
N∑
n=1
min
k∈K
{[
RU [n]−RE,k [n]
]+}
, (7a)
RU [n] = log2
(
1 +
P [n]h [n]
σ2
)
, (7b)
RE,k [n] = log2
(
1 +
P [n] gk [n]
σ2k
)
, (7c)
where σ2 and σ2k denote the variance of Gaussian noises at
the SU receiver and the kth Eve receiver, respectively.
In this paper, since the perfect location of PUs and Eves are
unknown, two robust trajectory and transmit power designs are
proposed, namely, the worst case and the outage-constrained
case. The details are presented as follows.
III. WORST-CASE ROBUST TRAJECTORY AND TRANSMIT
POWER DESIGN
In this section, the robust trajectory and transmit power
design problem is considered under the bounded location error
model. Under this practical location uncertainty model, a lower
bounded performance of UAV-enabled CR networks can be
estimated and guaranteed. Moreover, this model is appropriate
in many military applications requiring a high-level of security.
In this work, the average secrecy rate is maximized subject to
the mobility constraint, the transmit power constraint, and the
average interference power constraint. Since the robust trajec-
tory and transmit power design problem is non-convex with
infinite inequality constraints, a suboptimal iterative algorithm
is proposed based on the SCA method and S-Procedure. In
each iteration, a convex optimization problem is solved by
using the standard convex optimization method.
A. The Bounded Location Error Model
According to the works in [16] and [17], in practice, the
estimation errors for the location of PUs and Eves can be
modeled as the bounded location error model. The bounded
location error model for the location of the lth PU is given as
ql = q¯l + ∆ql, l ∈ L, (8a)
Ψl ,
{
∆ql ∈ R2×1 : ‖∆ql‖2 ≤ ω2l
}
, (8b)
and the bounded location error model for the location of the
kth Eve is given as
ek = e¯k + ∆ek, k ∈ K, (9a)
Ωk ,
{
∆ek ∈ R2×1 : ‖∆ek‖2 ≤ ξ2k
}
, (9b)
where q¯l and e¯k denote the estimates of the location vectors
ql and ek, respectively; ∆ql and ∆ek denote the location
estimation errors of ql and ek, respectively; Ψl and Ωk
represent the uncertainty regions of ql and ek, respectively;
ωl and ξk denote the radii of the uncertainty regions Ψl and
Ωk, respectively.
5B. Worst-Case Robust ASRM Problem
Based on the bounded location error model, the WCR-
ASRM problem subject to the UAV mobility constraint, the
transmit power constraint, and the average interference power
constraint is formulated as
max
P,Q
1
N
N∑
n=1
min
k∈K
{
RU [n]− max
∆ek∈Ωk
RE,k [n]
}
(10a)
s.t.
1
N
N∑
n=1
sl [n]P [n] ≤ Υ, ∀∆ql ∈ Ψl, l ∈ L, (10b)
(1) , (2a) , (2b), (10c)
where P and Q denote the sets of variables {P [n]}Nn=1 and
{q [n]}Nn=1, respectively. (10b) can guarantee that the average
interference power caused by the UAV to each PU does not
exceed the IT threshold for all location estimation errors
satisfying (8b). Owing to the nonlinear objective function and
the non-convex constraint in (10b), the original optimization
problem (10) is non-convex and challenging to solve. More-
over, the infinite inequality constraint caused by the uncertain
region complicates the problem. Note that the operator [·]+ in
the objective function can be safely omitted without affecting
the optimal value of the optimization problem. For more
relevant proof details, please refer to the work in [16].
In general, the formulated problem is non-convex and
intractable. As a compromise approach, we aim to design a
suboptimal algorithm to achieve an efficient solution. To this
end, slack variables αn, βn, and γl,n, where n ∈ N and l ∈ L,
are introduced. Thus, (10) can be equivalently expressed as
max
P,Q,α,β,γ
1
N
N∑
n=1
{log2 (αn)− βn} (11a)
s.t.
1
N
N∑
n=1
γl,n ≤ Υ, ∀l, (11b)
‖q [n]−qs‖2+H2− β0P [n]
σ2 (αn − 1) ≤ 0, ∀n, (11c)
‖q [n]−ek‖2+H2− β0P [n]
σ2k (2
βn−1)≥0,∀k,n,∆ek∈Ωk, (11d)
‖q [n]− ql‖2+H2− β0
γl,n
P [n] ≥ 0, ∀l, n,∆ql∈Ψl, (11e)
αn > 1, ∀n, (11f)
(1) , (2a) , (2b), (11g)
where α, β, and γ denote the sets of slack variables {αn}Nn=1,
{βn}Nn=1, and {{γl,n}Ll=1}Nn=1, respectively. Note that (11d)
and (11e) are infinite inequality constraints due to the uncer-
tainty of the location information. In order to tackle them, the
S-Procedure is introduced as follows.
Lemma 1 (S-Procedure) [37]: Let fj (x) = xTAjx +
2<{bTj x} + cj , j ∈ {1, 2}, where x ∈ CN×1, Aj ∈ HN ,
bj ∈ CN×1, and cj ∈ R. Then, the expression f1 (x) ≤ 0⇒
f2 (x) ≤ 0 holds if and only if there exists a µ ≥ 0 such that
µ
[
A1 b1
bH1 c1
]
−
[
A2 b2
bH2 c2
]
 0, (12)
provided that there exists a vector xˆ such that f1 (xˆ) < 0.
By applying the S-Procedure and introducing slack vari-
ables θk,n, χl,n, λk,n, and µl,n, where n ∈ N , l ∈ L, and
k ∈ K, (11) can be expressed equivalently as
max
P,Q,α,β,γ,θ,χ,λ,µ
1
N
N∑
n=1
{log2 (αn)− βn} (13a)
s.t.
[
(λk,n + 1) I2 − (q [n]− e¯k)
−(q [n]− e¯k)T ck,n − λk,nξ2k
]
 0, ∀k, n, (13b)
β0P [n]
σ2k (2
βn − 1) ≤ θk,n, ∀k, n, (13c)[
(µl,n + 1) I2 − (q [n]− q¯l)
−(q [n]− q¯l)T cl,n − µl,nω2l
]
 0, ∀l, n, (13d)
β0
γl,n
P [n] ≤ χl,n, ∀l, n, (13e)
λk,n ≥ 0, ∀k, n, µl,n ≥ 0, ∀l, n, (13f)
(11b) , (11c) , (11f) , (11g), (13g)
where ck,n and cl,n are given as, respectively,
ck,n = (q [n]− e¯k)T (q [n]− e¯k) +H2 − θk,n, (14a)
cl,n = (q [n]− q¯l)T (q [n]− q¯l) +H2 − χl,n, (14b)
where θ, χ, λ, and µ denote the sets of slack vari-
ables {{θk,n}Kk=1}Nn=1, {{χl,n}Ll=1}Nn=1, {{λk,n}Kk=1}Nn=1,
and {{µl,n}Ll=1}Nn=1, respectively. Thus, there are finite num-
bers of inequality constraints in problem (13). However, (13)
is still non-convex due to the existence of variables coupling
in (11c), (13b), (13c), (13d), and (13e). To solve this difficulty,
we introduce the slack variables, τ [n] = (P [n])−1 and
ϕn = 2
βn − 1, where n ∈ N . Then, the problem in (13)
can be rewritten as
max
τ ,Q,α,ϕ,γ,θ,χ,λ,µ
1
N
N∑
n=1
{log2 (αn)− log2 (ϕn + 1)} (15a)
s.t.
β0
σ2kτ [n]ϕn
≤ θk,n, ∀k, n, (15b)
β0
τ [n] γl,n
≤ χn, ∀l, n, (15c)
‖q [n]−qs‖2+H2− β0
σ2τ [n] (αn−1) ≤ 0, ∀n, (15d)
1
N
N∑
n=1
1
τ [n]
≤ P¯ , τ [n] ≥ 1
Pmax
, ∀n, (15e)
(1) , (11b) , (11f) , (13b) , (13d) , (13f), (15f)
where τ and ϕ denote the sets of the slack variables {τn}Nn=1
and {ϕn}Nn=1, respectively. Note that (15b) and (15c) are
convex constraints. However, (15d) is a non-convex constraint
which is verified in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 : Let f (x, y) , 1xy , where x > 0 and y > 0.
Then, f (x, y) is jointly convex with respect to x and y.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Meanwhile, the objective function in (15a) is non-concave,
since −log2 (ϕn + 1) is convex. Moreover, constraints (13b)
and (13d) are non-convex due to the existence of the second-
order variables x2[n] and y2[n] in ck,n and cl,n. Fortunately,
6the above functions are convex which are lower bounded
by the corresponding first-order Taylor approximations. For
a given set of feasible points, {τ˜ [n] , q˜ [n] , α˜n, ϕ˜n}Nn=1, in-
equalities (16) shown at the bottom of this page must hold
∀n ∈ N . Then, the lower bound value of (15) can be obtained
by solving the following problem:
max
τ ,Q,α,ϕ,γ,θ,χ,λ,µ
1
N
N∑
n=1
{log2 (αn) + Φ (ϕn)} (17a)
s.t. ‖q [n]− qs‖2 +H2 −Θ (τ [n] , αn) ≤ 0, ∀n, (17b)[
(λk,n + 1) I2 − (q [n]− e¯k)
−(q [n]− e¯k)T c˜k,n − λk,nξ2k
]
 0, ∀k, n, (17c)[
(µl,n + 1) I2 − (q [n]− q¯l)
−(q [n]− q¯l)T c˜l,n − µl,nω2l
]
 0, ∀l, n, (17d)
(1) , (11b) , (11f) , (13f) , (15b) , (15c) , (15e), (17e)
where c˜k,n an c˜l,n are respectively given as, respectively,
c˜k,n = (q˜ [n]− e¯k)T (2q [n]− e¯k− q˜ [n])+H2−θk,n, (18a)
c˜l,n = (q˜ [n]− q¯l)T (2q [n]− q¯l− q˜ [n])+H2−χl,n. (18b)
Note that (17) is a convex optimization problem, which can be
efficiently solved by using the standard convex optimization
method, e.g., the interior-point method [37]. Then, Algorithm
1 based on the SCA method is proposed to tighten the first-
order Taylor approximations. In this case, the suboptimal
solutions of the original optimization problem (10), P∗ and
Q∗, can be obtained by iteratively solving (17).
Algorithm 1: Iterative Algorithm for solving (10)
1: Initialization:
Initialize {τ˜ [n] , q˜ [n] , α˜n, ϕ˜n}Nn=1,
the threshold → 0.
2: Optimization:
repeat
1) Obtain suboptimal τ ∗, Q∗, α∗, and ϕ∗ by
solving (17).
2) if
∣∣∣Rsec (P∗,Q∗)−Rsec(P˜, Q˜)∣∣∣ ≤ 
break;
end
3) Update {τ˜ [n]}Nn=1 ← τ ∗, {q˜ [n]}Nn=1 ← Q∗,
{α˜n}Nn=1 ← α∗, {ϕ˜n}Nn=1 ← ϕ∗.
3: Output {P∗ and Q∗}
Remark 1: Due to the inequalities in (16b), (16c), and (16d),
the left hand side (LHS) of (15d) is a lower bound of (17b),
and the LHS of (13b) and (13d) are upper bounds for (17c) and
(17d), respectively. In other words, (17b), (17c), and (17d) hold
implying (15d), (13b), and (13d) hold, respectively. Hence, the
solution of problem (17) is a feasible suboptimal solution of
problem (15).
Remark 2: The convergence of Algorithm 1 is guaranteed.
Since (16a) is a lower bound of −log2 (ϕn + 1), the objective
function of (17) is a lower bound of the objective function
of (15). Note that the objective value of (15) is equal to that
of (17) only at feasible points {τ˜ [n] , q˜ [n] , α˜n, ϕ˜n}Nn=1, and
the objective value of (15) is larger than that of (17) with
the solution of (17). Thus, the objective value of (15) with
the solution of (17) is no less than that with the solution
{τ˜ [n] , q˜ [n] , α˜n, ϕ˜n}Nn=1. It means that the objective value
of (17) and (15) is non-descending over iteration.
Remark 3: In step 1 of Algorithm 1, the convex optimiza-
tion problem in (17) can be solved by using the interior-
point method (IPM) [37]. According to [38], the computational
complexity of Algorithm 1 using the IPM can be divided into
three parts, namely, the required numbers of iterations of the
SCA method, the iteration complexity, and the per-iteration
computation cost. It is assumed that the maximum number
of iterations of the SCA method is T1 and the accuracy of
the iteration is . Problem (17) has (K + L)N linear matrix
inequalities (LMIs) of size 3, 2(K+L+2)N+L+1 LMIs of
size 1. The number of decision variables m is on the order of
− log2 (ϕn + 1) ≥ −log2 (ϕ˜n + 1)−
1
(ϕ˜n + 1) ln 2
(ϕn − ϕ˜n) = Φ (ϕn) (16a)
β0
σ2τ [n] (αn − 1) ≥
(
β0
σ2
)(
1
τ˜ [n] (α˜n − 1) −
(τ [n]− τ˜ [n])
τ˜ [n]
2
(α˜n − 1)
− (αn − α˜n)
τ˜ [n] (α˜n − 1)2
)
= Θ (τ [n] , αn) (16b)
(q [n]− e¯k)T (q [n]− e¯k) ≥ (q˜ [n]− e¯k)T (2q [n]− e¯k − q˜ [n]) (16c)
(q [n]− q¯l)T (q [n]− q¯l) ≥ (q˜ [n]− q¯l)T (2q [n]− q¯l − q˜ [n]) (16d)
O
(
T1
√
(5K + 5L+ 4)N + L+ 1 ln
(
−1
)
m
{
(27 + 9m) (K + L)N +
[
2 (K + L+ 2)N + L+ 1
]
(1 +m) +m2
})
(19)
7(K+L)N , e.g., m = O((K+L)N), where O(·) is the big-O
notation. Thus, the total complexity of Algorithm 1 under the
bounded location error model is given by (19), as shown at the
bottom of this page. Note that the proposed Algorithm 1 has a
polynomial time computational complexity which is suitable
for practical implementation.
IV. OUTAGE-CONSTRAINED ROBUST TRAJECTORY AND
TRANSMIT POWER DESIGN
In this section, the robust trajectory and transmit power
design problem is considered under the probabilistic location
error model. The probabilistic location error model is differ-
ent from the bounded location error model as the latter is
appropriate to handle the extreme scenario where the system
performance has to be guaranteed even in the worst case.
Under the bounded location error model, the performance is
usually conservative since the worst-case objective function is
considered and all constraints should be rigorously hold. As an
alternative, the probabilistic location error model is considered
for tackling the issues caused by over protection. In this case,
the constraints involving the location error model are outage
probability constraints. Note that the OCR-ASRM problem is
even more challenging compare to the WCR-ASRM problem
due to the existence of probability constraints. Furthermore,
to provide a fair comparison between the performance under
two different location error models, a method is proposed to
ensure that the WCR-ASRM problem is a safe approximation
to the OCR-ASRM problem [39]. In this case, each feasible
point of the WCR-ASRM problem is also feasible to the OCR-
ASRM problem, and always satisfies the corresponding outage
probability constraints.
A. The Probabilistic Location Error Model
According to the work in [21], it is assumed that the loca-
tions of each PU and each Eve are stochastic and follow the
Gaussian distribution due to the estimation errors. Specifically,
x and y coordinates are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables. The Gaussian location error
models for the location of the lth PU and the kth Eve, are given
as, respectively,
ql = q¯l + ∆ql, ∆ql ∼ N
(
0, $2l I2
)
, ∀l ∈ L, (20a)
ek = e¯k + ∆ek, ∆ek ∼ N
(
0, ε2kI2
)
, ∀k ∈ K, (20b)
where q¯l and e¯k denote the estimated location; ∆ql and ∆ek
denote the location estimation errors; $2l and ε
2
k are variances
of the corresponding location estimation errors.
B. Outage-Constrained Robust ASRM Problem
Based on the probabilistic location error model, the OCR-
ASRM problem is studied under the outage probabilistic
constraints which is formulated as
max
P,Q,β,γ
1
N
N∑
n=1
{RU [n]− βn} (21a)
s.t. Pr{∆ek}Kk=1
{
max
k∈K
RE,k [n] ≤ βn
}
≥ 1− ρ, ∀n, (21b)
Pr{∆ql} {sl [n]P [n] ≤ γl,n} ≥ 1− φ, ∀l, n, (21c)
(11b) , (11g), (21d)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the maximum outage probability
associated with the transmission rate of all Eves and φ ∈ (0, 1]
denotes the maximum outage probability associated with the
interference power of all PUs. Since the location estimation
errors of Eves are probabilistic, the problem of maximizing the
average secrecy rate (7a) can be transformed into a problem
that maximizes (21a) while satisfying the corresponding out-
age probability constraint (21b) by introducing an auxiliary
variable βn. (21c) guarantees that the outage probability of
the interference power of the PUs being larger than γl,n is
less than φ. Note that the probability term in (21b) can be
regarded as the coupling of probability terms among Eves,
which is intractable and complicated. In order to decouple the
joint probabilistic constraint into tractable terms, by exploiting
the independence between the locations of Eves, we have the
following implication:
(21b)⇔
K∏
k=1
Pr{∆ek} {RE,k [n] ≤ βn} ≥ 1− ρ, ∀n, (22a)
⇐ Pr{∆ek} {RE,k [n] ≤ βn} ≥ 1− ρ¯, ∀k, n, (22b)
where ρ¯ = 1 − (1− ρ)1/K . (22b) means that the outage
probability of mutual information for each Eve being larger
than βn should be lower than ρ¯. Then, by introducing the
slack variables αn, n ∈ N , a lower bound value of problem
(21) can be obtained by solving the following problem:
max
P,Q,α,β,γ
1
N
N∑
n=1
{log2 (αn)− βn} (23a)
s.t. Pr{∆ek} {RE,k [n] ≤ βn} ≥ 1− ρ¯, ∀k, n, (23b)
‖q [n]−qs‖2+H2− β0P [n]
σ2 (αn − 1) ≤ 0, ∀n, (23c)
(11b) , (11f) , (11g) , (21c). (23d)
For a fair comparison between the performance of the
WCR-ASRM design and the OCR-ASRM design, the radii
of uncertainty regions, Ψl and Ωk, are chosen as [39]
ωl = $l
√
F−1
χ22
((1− φ)), ∀l ∈ L, (24a)
ξk = εk
√
F−1
χ22
(
(1− ρ)1/K
)
, ∀k ∈ K, (24b)
where F−1
χ22
(·) denotes the inverse cumulative distribution
function of a Chi-square random variable with 2 degrees
of freedom. Thus, the uncertainty radius ωl can satisfy
Pr{∆ql}
{
‖∆ql‖2 ≤ ω2l
}
= 1 − φ and the uncertainty radius
ξk can satisfy Pr{∆ek}
{
‖∆ek‖2 ≤ ξ2k
}
= 1 − ρ¯. By choos-
ing ωl and ξk, if constraints (11d) and (11e) are satisfied,
constraints (23b) and (21c) must be satisfied. Thus, the WCR-
ASRM problem (11) can be considered as a safe approxima-
tion to the OCR-ASRM problem (23). Note that the closed-
form expressions of constraints (21c) and (23b) are difficult
to derive directly due to the outage probability. To convert the
probability constraints into deterministic forms, the Bernstein-
type inequality is applied to provide a safe approximation of
problem (23), which is summarized as follows.
Lemma 2 (The Bernstein-type Inequality) [40]: Define A ∈
8HN , x ∼ N (0, I), b ∈ CN×1, c ∈ R, and ρ ∈ (0, 1], the
following implication holds
Pr
{
xTAx + 2<{xTb}+ c ≥ 0} ≥ 1− ρ
⇐

Tr (A)−√−2 ln (ρ)Υ1 + ln (ρ) υ2 + c ≥ 0,∥∥∥∥[vec (A)√2b
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ υ1,
υ2IN + A  0, υ2 ≥ 0,
(25)
where υ1 and υ2 are slack variables.
By applying Lemma 2, an approximate expression of the
outage interference power constraint (21c) can be given as
Tr (Al)−
√
−2 ln (φ)ηl,n+ln (φ) ζl,n+c¨n ≥ 0, ∀l, n, (26a)∥∥∥∥[vec (Al)√2bn
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ ηl,n, ∀l, n, (26b)
ζl,nI2 + Al  0, ζl,n ≥ 0, ∀l, n, (26c)
where ηl,n and ζl,n are slack variables; Al = $2l I2, bn =
$l (q¯l − q [n]), and
c¨l,n = (q [n]− q¯l)T (q [n]− q¯l) +H2 − β0
γl,n
P [n] . (27)
Note that the first part of (26c) always holds since ζl,n +
$2l ≥ 0. Similar to the outage interference power constraint,
the outage transmission rate constraints of eavesdroppers (23b)
can be approximated as
Tr (Ak)−
√
−2 ln (ρ¯)υk,n+ln (ρ¯) ςk,n+c¨k,n≥0,∀k, n, (28a)∥∥∥∥[vec (Ak)√2bk,n
]∥∥∥∥ ≤ υk,n, ∀k, n, (28b)
ςk,nI2 + Ak  0, ςk,n ≥ 0, ∀k, n, (28c)
where υk,n and ςk,n are slack variables; Ak = ε2kI2, bk,n =
εk (e¯k − q [n]), and
c¨k,n=(q [n]−e¯k)T (q [n]−e¯k)+H2− β0P [n]
σ2k (2
βn − 1) . (29)
Note that the first part of (28c) always holds since ςk,n+ε2k ≥
0. Thus, these LMIs in the first part of (26c) and (28c) can
be omitted. To tackle the coupling of variables in (23c), (27),
and (29), we introduce slack variables τ [n] = (P [n])−1 and
ϕn = 2
βn − 1. Thus, the approximation problem for (23) can
be rewritten as
max
τ ,Q,α,ϕ,γ,η,ζ,υ,ς
1
N
N∑
n=1
{log2 (αn)− log2 (ϕn + 1)} (30a)
s.t. ‖q [n]− qs‖2+H2− β0
σ2τ [n] (αn − 1) ≤ 0, ∀n, (30b)
(1) , (15e) , (11b) , (11f) , (26a)-(26c) , (28a)-(28c), (30c)
where η, ζ, υ, and ς denote the sets of slack vari-
ables {{ηl,n}Ll=1}Nn=1, {{ζl,n}Ll=1}Nn=1, {{υn}Kk=1}Nn=1 and
{{ςn}Kk=1}Nn=1, respectively. Note that (30) is still a non-
convex optimization problem and is difficult to solve due to
the non-concave objective function, the non-convex constraint
in (30b), and the existence of the second-order variables x2[n]
and y2[n] in (26a) and (28a).
In order to solve (30), a suboptimal iterative Algorithm 2 is
proposed based on the SCA method. To this end, we exploit
the first-order Taylor approximation to obtain these inequalities
in (16), which are derived in Section III. Thus, the lower bound
value of problem (30) can be obtained by solving the following
problem,
max
τ ,Q,α,ϕ,γ,η,ζ,υ,ς
1
N
N∑
n=1
{log2 (αn) + Φ(ϕn)} (31a)
s.t. ‖q [n]− qs‖2 +H2 −Θ (τ [n] , αn) ≤ 0, ∀n, (31b)
Tr (Al)−
√
−2 ln (φ)ηl,n+ln (φ) ζl,n+cˆl,n ≥ 0,∀l, n, (31c)
Tr (Ak)−
√
−2 ln (ρ¯)υk,n+ln (ρ¯) ςk,n+cˆk,n≥0,∀k, n, (31d)
(1) , (15e) , (11b) , (11f) , (26b) , (26c) , (28b) , (28c), (31e)
where
cˆl,n=(q˜ [n]−q¯l)T(2q [n]−q¯l−q˜ [n])+H2− β0
τ [n]γl,n
, (32a)
cˆk,n=(q˜ [n]−e¯k)T(2q [n]−e¯k−q˜ [n])+H2− β0
σ2kτ [n]ϕn
.
(32b)
Note that (31) is a convex optimization problem and can be
solved effectively via standard convex optimization methods.
Then, Algorithm 2 based on the SCA method can tighten these
first-order Taylor approximation constraints in (31). Thus, the
suboptimal solution of (30) can be obtained by iteratively
solving (31). Note that (30) is a safe approximation to the
original OCR-ASRM problem in (21). Thus, the suboptimal
solution of (30) is also the suboptimal solution of (21). The
pseudo code of Algorithm 2 under the probabilistic location
error model is omitted since the procedure is similar to that
of Algorithm 1.
Remark 4: The computational complexity of Algorithm 2
also arises from three parts, namely, the required numbers of
iterations of the SCA method, the iteration complexity, and the
per-iteration computation cost. It is assumed that the maximum
number of iterations of the SCA method of Algorithm 2 is T2
and the accuracy of the iteration of Algorithm 2 is the same as
that of Algorithm 1. Problem (31) has 2(K +L+ 2)N +L+
1 LMIs of size 1, (K + L)N second-order cone constraints
with dimension 7. The numbers of decision variables m is
on the order of (K + L)N , e.g., m = O((K + L)N). Then,
the total complexity of Algorithm 2 under the probabilistic
location error model is given by (33), as shown at the bottom
of this page. Note that the proposed Algorithm 2 also has a
polynomial time computational complexity which is suitable
for practical implementation.
Remark 5: By comparing (19) and (33), it can be observed
that T1 and T2 have less effect on the complexity of Algorithm
1 and Algorithm 2, respectively. Thus, the complexity differ-
ence between Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 is mainly due to
O
(
T2
√
4 (K + L+ 1)N + L+ 1 ln
(
−1
)
m
{
49 (K + L)N +
[
2 (K + L+ 2)N + L+ 1
]
(1 +m) +m2
})
(33)
9the iteration complexity and the per-iteration computation cost.
Note that the iteration complexity of Algorithm 1 is larger than
that of Algorithm 2. Besides, for the per-iteration computation
cost, there is a higher order polynomial term in Algorithm 1
than Algorithm 2. Thus, it can be seen that the complexity of
Algorithm 2 is lower than that of the Algorithm 1 since the
LMIs of size 2 in the first part of (26c) and (28c) are always
hold and can be omitted in Algorithm 2.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, simulation results are presented to verify
the performance of the proposed robust trajectory and transmit
power design schemes in Section III (denoted as the bounded
location scheme) and Section IV (denoted as the probabilistic
location scheme), as compared to the following three bench-
mark schemes: 1) non-robust joint trajectory and transmit
power scheme; 2) fixed trajectory scheme I; 3) fixed trajectory
scheme II. Specifically, the non-robust design can be obtained
from the WCR-ASRM design in Section III, where we treat the
estimated location of each Eve e¯k as the actual location of Eve,
e.g., ξk = 0, and then evaluate the worst-case average secrecy
rate obtained in the bounded location error model. Fixed tra-
jectory scheme I and fixed trajectory scheme II perform robust
transmit power allocation based on the bounded location error
model and the probabilistic location error model, respectively,
and design the UAV’s trajectory in the following manner: the
UAV flies straightly from the initial location to the location
right above the SU with the maximum speed Vmax, then
hovers there for a certain duration, and finally flies straightly
to the final location with the maximum speed Vmax by the
end of time T . This setting is also used to generate the initial
feasible points for the proposed robust schemes. According to
the parameters adopted in [8], [16], we set the constant flight
altitude of the UAV as H = 100 m, the horizontal coordinates
of the SU as (xs, ys) = (0, 0) m. It is assumed that there exists
one PU, e.g., L = 1, and the estimated horizontal coordinates
of the PU is (xp,1, yp,1) = (−40,−80) m. In this case, it
is possible to better observe the trend of the UAV’s transmit
power affected by the PU. It is assumed that there are K = 2
Eves and the estimated horizontal coordinates of Eves are
(xe,1, ye,1) = (240,−120) m and (xe,2, ye,2) = (−240, 120)
m, respectively. Other simulation parameters are set as follows:
ρ = 0.2, φ = 0.2, ε1 = 5, ε2 = 35, $1 = 5, Vmax = 10 m/s,
T/N = 1 s, Pmax = 4P¯ , and σ2 = σ21 = σ
2
2 = −50 dBm.
Fig. 2 shows the convergence performance of our proposed
algorithms for the bounded location scheme and the probabilis-
tic location scheme. To ensure that the UAV has enough time
to fly freely and hover at desired locations, the flight time T is
set as 60 s. In order to study the effect of the transmit power
and the IT threshold on the performance of the UAV-enabled
CR network, we consider three different cases: 1) P¯ = −10
dB, Υ = 2.5×10−7 W; 2) P¯ = −20 dB, Υ = 3×10−8 W; 3)
P¯ = −20 dB, Υ = 2.5× 10−7 W. It can been seen from Fig.
2 that the achievable average secrecy rate of case 1 is higher
than that of case 3, as a higher transmit power can be used for
information transfer to improve the security communication
performance of the UAV system. Moreover, the superiority
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Fig. 2. The average secrecy rate versus the number of iterations.
of the achievable average secrecy rate of case 3 over case 2
can be explained by the fact that the higher the IT threshold,
the smaller the limitation of the UAV’s transmit power. When
the tolerable interference power threshold of the PUs is large
enough, the average interference power constraint is inactive.
In this case, the average interference power of the PU has
no effect on the trajectory design and the power allocation.
In contrast, the transmit power constraint is active and has
a significant influence on the trajectory design and power
allocation. When the tolerable interference power threshold
of the PUs is small enough, the transmit power constraint is
inactive. In this case, the average interference power constraint
is active and has an effect on the trajectory design and power
allocation. Thus, the UAV can achieve a higher average secrecy
rate through a more flexible power allocation optimization.
It is observed that the two proposed iterative algorithms can
converge within a few number of iterations. It can be seen that
more iterations are needed to achieve convergence when the
given average transmit power of the UAV P¯ is sufficiently
large. The reason is that when the given average transmit
power is large, the initial feasible points (fixed trajectory) have
a great impact on the secure communication performance,
resulting in a low average secrecy rate at the beginning of
iterations. Thus, more iterations are needed to converge to the
desired suboptimal solution. It is also observed that case 3
can converge faster than case 2. In fact, due to the higher IT
threshold in case 3, the existence of the PU does not affect the
maximum average secrecy rate optimization problem, resulting
in a faster convergence than case 2.
Fig. 3(a) shows the UAV’s trajectories obtained by different
schemes when T = 60 s, P¯ = −10 dB, and Υ = 2.5× 10−7
W. Fig. 3(b) shows the UAV’s transmit power versus the
flight time T under different schemes. It can be seen from
Fig. 3(a) that the UAV’s trajectory obtained by the proposed
probabilistic location scheme is similar to that obtained by the
bounded location scheme, and the UAV first flies towards the
SU along an arc path away from Eve 1 at a high speed, then
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Fig. 3. (a) The UAV’s trajectories for different schemes; (b) The UAV’s
transmit power versus the flight time.
hovers over a point near the SU for a period of time, and finally
flies along an arc path away from Eve 2 to the final location
for the rest of the time. Note that a hovering point is the
point where the maximum secrecy rate can be achieved among
all the points contributing the UAV’s trajectory. However,
for the non-robust design, the hovering point is set directly
above the SU. The reason is that the non-robust scheme
ignores the uncertainty of all Eves locations. Thus, the UAV
cannot obtain the desirable hover point through the non-robust
scheme, resulting in an inefficient communication and a severe
performance loss. Moreover, as can be seen from Fig. 3,
the average interference power constraint of the PU has a
low impact on the UAV’s trajectory but has a significant
impact on the UAV’s transmit power. This shows that the
trajectory optimization of the UAV under the line-of-sight
channel plays an important role in the improvement of the
secrecy rate of the SU. Thus, the UAV chooses to reduce
the transmit power rather than stay away from the PU to
satisfy the average interference power constraint of the PU.
In Fig. 3(b), the UAV’s transmit power is relatively small
in the first 20 seconds. The reason is that in the first 20
seconds of the flight, the UAV is close to the PU, and the UAV
reduces its transmit power to reduce the interference caused
to the PU. In contrast, the UAV’s transmit power obtained
by fixed trajectory scheme II is relatively small in the last
20 seconds. Comparing to fixed trajectory scheme I, it can
be seen that fixed trajectory scheme II only optimizing the
transmit power is more difficult to satisfy the corresponding
outage constraint under the probabilistic location error model.
Hence, due to the large uncertainty of Eve 2, the UAV under
fixed trajectory scheme II should significantly reduce the
transmit power when approaching Eve 2. Furthermore, the
actual average transmit power of the UAV is less than the
given transmit power limit P¯ due to the existence of the
average interference power constraints. Also, it can be seen
that the average transmit power of the proposed schemes is
larger than that of the benchmark schemes. The reason is that
the proposed probabilistic location scheme and the bounded
location scheme both have a stronger ability to utilize energy
resources than those three benchmark schemes while satisfying
the QoS requirement of the PU.
Fig. 4 shows the average secrecy rate versus the total
flight time under different schemes when P¯ = −10 dB and
Υ = 2.5 × 10−7 W. It is seen that the average secrecy rate
increases with the total flight time, regardless of the schemes.
The reason is that as the total flight time increases, the UAV
has more time to hover over the desirable point to achieve
a more efficient communication which improves the average
secrecy rate. It is also observed that as the total flight time
increases, the gaps of the average secrecy rate between the
proposed schemes and the benchmark schemes are enlarged.
In fact, a longer flight time magnifies the performance loss
since the UAV in benchmark schemes hovers on the undesired
location for communication. In addition, it can be seen that
the achievable average secrecy rate of the probabilistic location
scheme is higher than that of the bounded location scheme. It
can be explained by the fact that the secure performance of
the UAV-enabled CR system achieved by the bounded location
scheme is too conservative due to the worst-case objective
function and stringent constraints.
Fig. 5 shows the average secrecy rate versus the UAV’s
average transmit power under different schemes when T = 60
s and Υ = 2.5× 10−7 W. It can be seen that when the UAV’s
average transmit power is lower than -15 dB, the average
secrecy rate first increases rapidly with the transmit power.
However, when the UAV’s average transmit power is higher
than -10 dB, the average secrecy rate becomes saturated.
The reason is that with the increasing transmit power in the
low transmit power regime, the UAV can fully exploit the
benefit brought by the optimized trajectory to establish a
efficient communication. In contrast, when P¯ is sufficiently
large, the UAV’s transmit power is limited by the IT threshold
Υ. Thus, the average secrecy rate is mainly determined by
the UAV’s trajectory. Particularly, it is seen that the average
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-35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0
Power (dB)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Av
er
ag
e 
se
cr
ec
y 
ra
te
 (b
ps
/H
z)
Probabilistic location
Bounded location
Non-robust scheme
Fixed trajectory I
Fixed trajectory II
Fig. 5. The average secrecy rate versus the UAV’s average transmit power.
secrecy rates achieved by fixed trajectory scheme I and II
become saturated when the UAV’s average transmit power
is higher than -15 dB. This indicates that compared with
other schemes, fixed trajectory schemes I and II result in
a larger interference to the PU and obtain a lower energy
efficiency. It is also observed that the gap of the achievable
average secrecy rate between the bounded location scheme
and the non-robust scheme becomes larger as the average
transmit power increases. In fact, the high transmit power
intensifies the performance losses as the non-robust scheme
ignores the location estimation errors of Eves. Thus, as the
average transmit power increases, the deviation of the non-
robust optimized trajectory and the proposed robust optimized
trajectory becomes larger, resulting in a large performance
loss.
Fig. 6 shows the average secrecy rate versus the interference
temperature threshold under different schemes when T = 60
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Fig. 6. The average secrecy rate versus the interference temperature threshold.
s and P¯ = −17 dB. It can be seen that the average secrecy
rate increases with the IT threshold since more transmit power
can be utilized to improve the communication performance.
Note that when the IT threshold is larger than 11 × 10−8
W, the average secrecy rates achieved by all schemes become
saturated except for fixed trajectory schemes I and II. This
indicates that fixed trajectory schemes cannot fully utilize the
given average transmit power at Υ = 11× 10−8 W. It is also
seen that the achievable average secrecy rate of the non-robust
scheme is rapidly reduced when the IT threshold is less than
7 × 10−8 W. The reason is that when the noise power that
the PU can tolerate is very low, the power allocation of the
UAV is severely limited. In this case, the non-robust scheme
ignores the uncertainty of all Eves locations, which may result
in undesirable UAV’s trajectories and inefficient communica-
tion links, further leading to a more serious degradation of
communication performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Secure communication was studied in a UAV-enabled CR
network. Robust trajectory and transmit power were jointly
designed to realize secure communication while protecting
the PU from the harmful interference under the bounded
location error model and the probabilistic location error model.
Two iterative algorithms based on these two location error
models were proposed to obtain a suboptimal solution of
the formulated non-convex problems. Theoretical derivations
and simulation results showed that the proposed probability
location scheme not only has lower algorithm complexity, but
also achieves a higher average secrecy rate compare to the
proposed bounded location scheme. Moreover, it was shown
that the average secrecy rate obtained by our proposed robust
trajectory and transmit power schemes are higher than those
achieved by the benchmark schemes.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The Hessian matrix of f (x, y), where x > 0 and y > 0, is
given as
∇2f (x, y) = 1
xy
[
2x−2 (xy)−1
(xy)
−1
2y−2
]
=
1
xy
[
x−2 0
0 y−2
]
+
1
xy
[
x−1
y−1
] [
x−1 y−1
]  0. (34)
Note that the Hessian matrix of f (x, y) can be rewritten as a
linear combination of two positive semidefinite matrices. Thus,
f (x, y) is a convex function. This completes the proof.
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